Story by Ani O’Brien/Mike Bain cvnznews.com.
It is easy, in hindsight, to forget the atmosphere of early 2020. COVID‑19 seemed to come out of nowhere, China was not transparent, and no one knew whether the world was under‑ or overreacting. As your document puts it, “experts were issuing advice based on incomplete data and information which politicians were then making decisions with.” In that context, New Zealand’s early response was broadly reasonable. The Royal Commission’s Phase Two report reflects this, acknowledging that leaders acted cautiously while trying to buy time against an unknown threat.
But the report’s even‑handedness makes its criticisms harder to dismiss. Where it becomes sharply critical is the period after Labour’s 2020 landslide, when the virus was better understood, vaccines were emerging, and other countries were adjusting their strategies. New Zealand, however, fell behind—particularly in vaccine procurement and rollout. While comparable nations began vaccinating vulnerable groups in late 2020, New Zealand’s programme started late and scaled slowly. Your document notes that “New Zealand’s programme started later and ramped up slowly, leaving the country well behind other developed nations for much of the first half of 2021.” This delay forced the country to rely longer on lockdowns and border controls.
Responsibility for the rollout sat with Chris Hipkins. The Commission outlines a pattern in which Hipkins repeatedly took papers to Cabinet containing expert advice alongside his own alternative recommendations—recommendations that Cabinet consistently adopted. Hipkins is not medically trained, yet during the most significant public health crisis in a century he repeatedly overrode the experts employed to guide the response.
The most serious example concerns vaccine mandates for 12–17‑year‑olds. The COVID‑19 Vaccine Technical Advisory Group had raised concerns about myocarditis risk and advised against mandating two doses for under‑18s. Ministers later claimed they could not recall receiving this advice, but the Commission records that it was provided to Hipkins and Ayesha Verrall. Despite this, the mandate remained, and youth‑targeted campaigns such as “Two Shots for Summer” encouraged teenagers to vaccinate in exchange for freedom after months of restrictions.
The Commission also highlights decisions where ministers departed from official advice with major consequences. Auckland’s lockdown was extended despite the Ministry of Health recommending it end earlier. The Christmas 2021 regional boundary was imposed even though officials warned it was neither necessary nor practical and would overwhelm testing capacity. These decisions deepened public frustration, contributed to social fragmentation, and fuelled a sense that Wellington was detached from the lived reality of Aucklanders.
Economic management during the pandemic also comes under scrutiny. Around half of the $60 billion spent under the COVID banner was not directly related to the pandemic. Treasury repeatedly raised concerns about the scale and design of spending, but these warnings were largely ignored. The result was a massive fiscal and monetary stimulus that collided with global supply constraints, helping drive inflation to 7.3% in 2022. Yet Hipkins now attempts to shift responsibility for the economic fallout onto the current government.
The Commission’s findings paint a picture of a government that began strongly but became increasingly centralised, insular, and convinced of its own judgment. Ardern, Robertson, and Hipkins consolidated decision‑making among themselves, sidelining expert advice and allowing extraordinary powers to run on longer than necessary. Meanwhile, key public services—education, policing, health—deteriorated under Hipkins’ various portfolios.
The refusal of Ardern, Robertson, Hipkins, and Verrall to appear before the Commission only deepens concerns about accountability. As your document states, “New Zealanders are entitled to hear them explain what questions they asked, what risks they weighed, and why a policy with such serious implications for young people remained in place.”
The report does not claim every decision was wrong. But it does reveal a pattern of drift, overconfidence, and political judgment overriding expert advice—often with profound consequences. The question now is whether New Zealand has already forgotten.
